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Abstract 
          This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and 
non-standard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing.  A 
simple experiment was performed to measure a known preference, the value of a card that can be 
exchanged for $2 cash. The measurement does not produce the known preference and instead 
reports a preference that has properties often cited in support of non-standard preference theories 
and framing. Close examination reveals that the divergence of the measured preference from the 
known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects’ misconception of the game 
form.  We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of 
preference revelation, and that mistakes in choices can masquerade as having been produced by 
non-standard preferences and may reflect an error at the foundation of the theory of framing.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The paper addresses a tension that exists among competing theories regarding fundamental 
properties of preferences. On one hand, the standard theory of preference postulates that 
individuals have preferences over outcomes and those preferences are independent of the feasible 
set of outcomes.  On the other hand, non-standard preference theories, such as those based on the 
theory of  framing or endowments, hold that preferences are dependent on and perhaps even 
constructed from the context faced by the choosing individual and might have no particular 
existence outside that context.1  We suggest that the tension is exacerbated by a specific form of 
mistake made by individuals in standard choice elicitation procedures, especially when combined 
with the usual convention of equating choice with preference.   
          We perform an experiment similar to testing a scale by measuring a known weight.  The 
experiment employs the Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964; hereafter BDM) method to 
measure the preference for an object for which the subject’s preferences are known—a card that 
can be redeemed from the experimenter for $2.  All theories agree that the preference value the 
subject places on the card is $2.  However, subjects’ choices systematically involve a mistake 
that we identify as a failure of game form recognition.  As a consequence, instead of revealing 
the known $2 preference the choices masquerade as reflecting properties often cited as evidence 
of non-standard preferences.  
         From the simple experiment we identify four ingredients that contribute to the tension 
between standard and non-standard preference theory.  The first ingredient involves a practice 
common to both revealed preference theory and framing theory.  Both interpret choice as 
revealing, if not defining, a preference.  The possibility of systematic mistakes implies, however 
that researchers in general should not simply define choice, without qualification, as measuring 
preference with an error term added and should be careful in interpreting systematic deviations 
from the standard model as evidence of alternative preferences.   Secondly, close examination 
reveals an error in the theory of framing as it is applied to the structure and measurement of 
preference theory in economics. The issue is addressed in Section II.  A third ingredient stems 
                                                 
1 See Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006). The contrast of ideas is revealed by their summary of the issue: “If different 
elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do 
they exist?” Some may consider framing as an unstructured catch-all for context dependence, but without structure 
and supporting theory it is difficult to envision how it could be rejectable and to take seriously proposals to modify 
policy and law to reflect properties of preferences derived from framing theory. 
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from the fact that the BDM method of eliciting preferences is not reliable. Sections III and IV 
develop a method for measuring its inaccuracy.  We emphasize that our interest is not in 
exploring how more elaborate instructions and training of subjects in the use of the BDM can 
“improve” its ability to reveal preferences more accurately. While such a task might be very 
useful, it is an aside to the issue we pose and in any case, researchers using the BDM in choice 
experiments employ a wide variety of instructions and examples. The fourth ingredient is the fact 
that subject mistakes can be interpreted as evidence of a particular form of preference. Sections 
V and VI show that our data appear to demonstrate a sensitivity to context which is often 
described as evidence that preferences are constructed from framing. Our analysis reveals, 
however, that this apparent frame-based pattern in the data can be a consequence of a specific 
type of mistake by the decision-makers.   Many decision-makers appear to confuse the second 
price auction incentives of the BDM with a first price auction, which is a failure of game form 
recognition. The paper concludes with observations from the literature and highlights difficulties 
rejecting preference theories based on framing, and also suggests possible constructive 
interpretations of non-standard preferences that can be useful for policy.  
 
II. Mistakes, Revealed Preference and Framing 
 
While many forms of misconceptions are possible, the misconception studied here is a “failure of 
game form recognition.” It is a failure of the decision maker to recognize the proper connections 
between the acts available for choice and the consequences of choice, which by necessity, are 
associated with the method of measuring preferences.  If the individual fails to understand the 
connection between acts and outcomes, the choice of acts can be misleading about the 
preferences over outcomes.  In such cases, choice cannot be equated with preference over 
consequences.   
The connection between the consequences of acts and the acts themselves is sufficiently 
obvious as part of the theory of choice in economics that it would seem to require no discussion. 
Together they form a “feasible set” of consequences from which the choice is selected. Clearly, 
choices and decisions do not reveal preference if an individual is mistaken about the commodity 
in the sense that she thinks the purchase is for an X when she is actually buying a Y. That type of 
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misconception will be called a failure of game form recognition.2 The mistaken choice should 
not be interpreted as a preference for Y. There would seem to be little disagreement that choices 
based on mistakes do not reflect revealed preferences over commodities any more than would be 
the case if the context included a magician’s “sleight of hand,” fraud or fine print too small to 
read. Mistakes, decision error and noise can complicate inferences about fundamental economic 
primitives, and these complications call for stochastic and heterogeneous models. (For an 
important application to decision-making when agents face risk or uncertainty, see Wilcox, 2008; 
2011.) This motivates the empirical approach presented below in Section VI. As noted by 
Kőszegi and Rabin (2008), one must control for the confounds of mistakes and (false) subjective 
beliefs before claiming that choices are consistent with non-standard preferences. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
                            
Study them carefully. To earn $20 you must choose 
 
 
  . 
 
 
A simple example of an optical illusion illustrates the subtleties. The example highlights 
the importance of perception for research on preference. It also demonstrates the influence on 
game form recognition and the difficulty in rejecting any theory when game form recognition is 
an issue.3  Consider the task represented in Figure 1 in which the subject is given a monetary 
incentive to choose a specific oval.  The subject is asked to follow the instructions and chose one 
of the ovals as directed.   
                                                 
2 The concept of a game form reflects the traditional tools of game theory in which distinctions are made among 
game structures that connect acts to outcomes, preferences over outcomes, and decisions that are the choices from 
among acts.  Much of economic theory proceeds on the assumption that these elements are known and treated as 
“common knowledge.” When the elements are not known, information and information sets are key concepts that 
might be extended to deal with the misunderstanding of the game form but this issue is not part of the analysis here.  
3 Tversky and Kahneman (1986) use an optical illusion to suggest that by analogy to principles governing vision that 
preferences are subject to context.  
Consider the following task. Study the ovals below.  You will earn 
$20 if you mark an X through the correct one. 
LEFT 
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If you are similar to many people, a well-known optical illusion will prevent you from 
seeing that your maximum payoff occurs if and only if you choose the small oval on the left.  
Because of this misperception, your choice might be one of the other ovals. (In order to see that 
your preference is to choose the smallest oval on the left, do not look at the black puzzle-looking 
pieces. Instead look at the white areas between the black parts. You might be able to see the 
word “LEFT”. For those who still have problems seeing the word, the symbols, bracketed by 
black lines becomes                 ). 
The example illustrates how incorrect inferences about preferences can emerge from the 
convention of equating preference with choice in the presence of misconceptions of the game 
form.4 Naturally the subject’s preference is to choose the oval that produces the most money, but 
the subject may not understand the relationship between the acts (the choice of oval) and the 
consequences of the acts (the money received). In the absence of a precise specification, classical 
revealed preference theory would just treat the preferences as random.  Unconstrained 
imagination can produce many plausible theories. What are the possibilities? Is there a 
preference across oval size such as a bias against small ovals? Location presents a possibility that 
the construction reflects a bias against extremes such as the far left or right. Other possibilities 
exist such as a focus on the most prominent oval followed by adjustment to others.  This cannot 
be resolved without additional theory or observation. 
The theory of framing developed by Kahneman and Tversky is an important step toward 
filling the need for a theory of perception and the process through which the game form becomes 
understood.  They offer their theory as an alternative to a broad theory of rational choice.  While 
preferences are equated with choices, as is typical with revealed preference methodology, the 
concept of rational choice is not explicitly defined.  Instead, Kahneman and Tversky assume that 
rational choice must exhibit consistency and coherence as defined by a concept of “procedural 
invariance.”   
The concept of procedural invariance draws heavily on the property of revealed 
preference in that if the decision makers understanding and/or perception of a feasible set of 
                                                 
4 Failures of game form recognition have been documented elsewhere in the literature and are known to be a source 
of anomalies in experimental work (Rydval et al., 2009; Chou et al., 2009; Cox and James, 2012). Harrison (1990) 
introduces the idea of “games of (potentially) inconsistent information” to describe circumstances in which the 
subjects’ beliefs may not correspond to the objective probability distributions assumed or known in the underlying 
theoretical model. Game form recognition is nicely illustrated by the Tower of Hanoi example in Harrison and List 
(2004) and McDaniel and Rutström (2001). 
LEFT 
5 
 
consequences is not changed, then a choice reflecting preference would not change (except as 
randomly perturbed).   The “feasible set” is naturally defined by the game form, the connections 
between acts and the consequences of acts.  If the perception of the feasible set is changed even 
when the real feasible set has not changed, as could be the case if the acts and consequences are 
described differently, then the standard theory does not predict that the choice should remain the 
same. When the perceived feasible set changes, the concept of procedural invariance does not 
apply and a systematic change in choice cannot be interpreted as a change in preferences and is 
not a violation of rationality in sense of economic theory.   
           Game form misconceptions reveal difficulties with the theory of framing. Tversky and 
Kahneman’s concept of a “frame” is tied to the perception of the game form, the connection 
between acts and outcomes.  Tversky and Kahneman (1981) make that point clearly: “We use the 
term ‘decision frame’ to refer to the decision-makers conception of the acts, outcomes, and 
contingencies associated with a particular choice” (page 453).  Thus, the Tversky and Kahneman 
concept of a frame merges elements of the game form that economics traditionally keeps 
separate, namely, the preferences over outcomes on one hand and on the other, the relationship 
between outcomes and the instruments of choice (the perception of the feasible set of options).  
Different frames that result in different choices are not violations of procedural invariance if the 
subject’s perception of the set of options is different.   If different frames lead to different 
understandings of the game form, different choices cannot be interpreted as reflecting different 
preferences. Thus, choices that change in response to frame changes are not direct evidence of 
changing (or labile) preferences.  Violations of procedural invariance in the Tversky and 
Kahneman sense are not necessarily violations of rational choice in the revealed preference 
sense. Tests must include a control and test for game form misconceptions. 
           Many experiments show the influence of a frame, which leads Tversky and Kahneman 
(1986) to draw the inference that rational choice has no behavioral foundation and conclude that 
the standard theory of preference must be changed.   However, as they note if the frame is 
transparent then the choices satisfy key conditions such as dominance and so invariance tends 
not to be violated (see page S272). They highlight this interpretation in the abstract of this 
important paper (page S251): 
Alternative descriptions of a decision problem often give rise to 
different preferences, contrary to the principle of invariance that 
underlies the rational theory of choice…Invariance and dominance 
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are obeyed when their application is transparent and often violated 
in other situations. (emphasis added) 
 
If the pattern of results for nontransparent frames were viewed as mistakes derived from game 
form misconceptions, Tversky and Kahneman could have concluded that confused subjects make 
choices that do not seem rational and turned the analysis to the application of standard theory for 
non-confused subjects.5  Of course a focus on the nature of subject confusion and how 
misperception of the game form can lead to properties of system and market behavior, some 
undesirable and some desirable, would join an analysis with a long history of economics research 
with that focus.6  
           Picking up the analysis of preference where Tversky and Kahneman leave the theory is 
easier said than done.  Testing a theory of preference based on framing presents a challenge.  The 
preference, which the theory seeks to explain, is determined by the context of the measurement 
including the methods used to measure it.  According to the theory, all features of the context are 
part of the preference-determining frame.  It is a classical observer effect: that what is to be 
measured is influenced by the attempt to measure it.  This reflects a deep problem of testability 
to which we will return in the final section of the paper in the light of the experimental results.   
  
III. Untangling the Concepts: Preference Measurement and the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak Method 
Our approach to untangling the concepts while respecting the need to maintain as much 
observability as possible is to focus on the preference measurement method.   We study 
commodities, acts and consequences that are observable and for which subjects have clearly 
identifiable preferences.7 The exercise is based on an uncontroversial preference, with no 
                                                 
5 In addition to a theory of preference, Kahneman and Tversky introduce a special theory of subjective probability 
that is closely related to game form recognition.  A “question-induced beliefs” conjecture has been associated with 
the BDM procedure that can influence choice similar to those predicted by non-standard preference theories. The 
issue of subjective probabilities is not addressed in this paper (see Plott and Zeiler, 2011). 
6 A wide range of economic models are based on the failure of game from recognition.  Examples include the 
competitive model in which individuals make an obvious mistake when considering prices as constants.  The 
Cournot model of price adjustment has competitors constantly making the mistake that their rivals’ prices will not 
change.  Monopoly in a general equilibrium model acts with extreme myopia when failing to recognize how its 
decisions can ripple back through the economy to influence its decision making environment (see the discussion at 
Plott, 1996). 
7 We focus on commodities because they are a fundamental building block in economics, as opposed to the more 
abstract concept of “prospects.” The “prospects” of prospect theory are defined in terms of subjectively determined 
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objective risk or uncertainty to bring expected- or non-expected utility theories into play. We can 
therefore use that preference to assess the accuracy produced by the BDM measurement method.  
An accurate theory and method of measurement should accurately return the measurements of 
things for which measurements are known. The method is like using a known weight to test the 
accuracy of a scale. Since the preference is known this provides an opportunity to trace any 
observed departure from the known preference to the measurement methods and an assessment 
of what form the unobserved and uncontrolled perception of the game form takes. 
 The preference is for dollars and for a card that is directly translated into two dollars with 
certainty.  As emphasized by Kahneman et al. (1990, page 1328), preference inducement of this 
form implies that the subjects should value the card at its induced value. Non-standard theories 
of preference do not differ from the standard theory. All theories agree. The rate of substitution 
for the card and money is “two” just like the rate of substitution of five dollar bills for ten dollar 
bills is “two,” as it is demonstrated in market transactions every day.  Indeed, the experiment 
itself has an internal consistency check on the rate of substitution.8 We pose an experiment that is 
widely used in studies of framing theory, the willingness to accept as measured by the BDM. We 
also perform the experiment in an environment which minimizes the influence of the 
experimenter and training, which have both been implicated in affecting measurements in earlier 
scientific analysis. 
The BDM mechanism has a long history of use as a tool for measuring preferences.  The 
subject is required to state a dollar value for an object, such as a mug or a lottery. The stated 
dollar value is compared to a randomly drawn price. If the measurement is a buying exercise, the 
subject buys at the randomly determined price if it is less than the subject’s stated value.  If the 
measurement is a selling exercise, then the subject receives the randomly drawn price if it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
reference points.  Thus, prospects differ from person to person, reflect no common unit of measurement and need 
not be observable. The focus on commodity spaces in economics stems from their central role in defining an 
observable feasible set and in connecting preferences to scarce resources and the laws of supply and demand.  The 
common unit of measurement addresses the need for a concept of “units” that can be summed across agents, 
captures the concept of market price per unit, and defines the basic concepts of equilibrium and efficient allocations 
in precise terms.  
8 The card was a thick piece of paper.  The subject could keep the card if she wanted. Unless it was valued as some 
sort of trophy or work of art it had no more value other than scraps of paper. Its only possible value was from giving 
it back to the experimenter and collecting the $2. The subject could keep the card if she placed a value on it that 
exceeded the $2 so the choice to exchange it was value revealing. Of the 264 cases in which subjects faced the 
decision to keep the card or to turn it in for the $2 in all 264 cases they took the $2, including 217 cases when 
subjects stated a BDM willingness-to-accept value greater than $2. Logic, theory, and data reveal that the subjective 
value of the card was the objectively known and uncontroversial $2.  
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above the subject’s stated value. Because the subject does not determine the price paid or 
received, only whether it is paid or received, she has a dominant strategy to state her true value. 
The subject cannot lose by accurately stating her preferences for the objects and might gain. The 
mechanism is popular because non-incentivized expressions of preferences for objects that are 
collected by alternative methods need not be (theoretically) accurately expressed.   
The basic theory of the mechanism finds application to wide areas of economics that 
focus on policy and institutional design including auctions and public goods. For example, it 
shares the same (dominant strategy) incentive properties as the second-price Vickrey auction. It 
is also widely used as a tool for preference measurement in growing and important new subfields 
of economics such as behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. 
The reliability of the BDM has been the subject of considerable research and our 
experimental design is extremely simple relative to other applications in the literature.9  In part, 
the simplicity of our design is dictated by a need to strip the experiment from other potential 
explanatory variables that can be found in the more complex applications.  Our approach is a bit 
“upside down” from the usual applications of the BDM where the preference for the object is not 
known and is sought through the application of the BDM mechanism.  By contrast we use an 
object for which the preference is known and clearly defined: money. The objective of our 
experiment is to determine if the application of the BDM to measure the preference, as if we did 
not know what the preference is, returns an accurate measure of the preference that we know 
exists. It is a test of measurement accuracy and reliability since people prefer more money to 
less. In essence, our experiment amounts to giving subjects an opportunity to express a 
preference for money stated in the context of a BDM method of preference measurement.  
The opportunity given the subjects is shown in Figure 2.  Subjects are handed the card 
exactly as displayed, with the left half of the figure on the front side of the card and the right half 
                                                 
9 E.g., Bohm et al., 1997; Irwin et al., 1998; Grether et al. 2007; James, 2007; Urbancic, 2011; Kagel and Levin, 
1993 (indirectly through the study of second-price auctions).  While the results have been mixed it survives as a 
useful tool, and researchers have employed it in various ways. Its performance appears better when buying or selling 
prices are chosen from a price list (Vossler and McKee, 2006; Murphy et al., 2010), although the use of a coarse grid 
of possible valuations does not provide narrowly-defined valuation estimates and thus a relatively weak test. Harstad 
(2000) compares ascending bid English auctions and second-price auctions and identifies the key role of feedback 
for promoting learning. Rutström (1998) documents less overbidding in the BDM compared to second-price 
auctions. Some studies have “trained” subjects on its revelation incentives using objects of known, objective value 
before using it to value things of interest (e.g., lotteries, products), e.g., Noussair et al. (2004a; 2004b). Others have 
trained subjects using different lotteries before eliciting values of objects (Plott and Zeiler, 2005; later comments by 
Isoni et al. (2011) put these training procedures at the center of the discussion). Researchers have also used 
examples and explained the strategy of the process and why it is theoretically incentive compatible. 
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on the back. The first sentence explains that card is worth $2.  Subjects are instructed to state an 
offer price that amounts to a minimal selling price for the card.  A posted price is randomly 
drawn from the interval [0, $݌̅] where the lower and upper limits are clearly printed on the card 
and the upper limit differs randomly across subjects. If the posted price is above the subject’s 
offer price the subject is paid the posted price and if not the subject is paid the $2 for the card.  
After the subject states an offer price, the opaque tag on the back can be removed, revealing the 
pre-drawn random posted price. Notice that the procedure removes the possibility that the posted 
price might depend on the subject’s offer price.  It also largely removes the experimenter from 
personal contact with the subject.  Thus, concerns based on how the behavior of the experimenter 
might influence the subjects do not apply. After she reveals the posted price the subject computes 
the amount received for the card as determined by her offer price and the randomly determined 
posted price. 
 
Front Side of Card     Back Side of Card 
 
Figure 2: Decision Form Used in Both Rounds 
This ticket is worth $2.00 to you.
You can sell it.
Name your offer price _________________________.
Located under the tape on the other side of this card 
is a posted price.
The posted price was drawn randomly between:
[$ __________ and $ __________ ]
If your offer price is below the posted price on the 
back of the card then you sell your ticket at the posted 
price. 
If your offer price is above the posted price on the 
back of the card then you do not sell your ticket but 
you do collect the $2.00 value of the ticket.
You can view the posted price after you have 
named your price.
Posted price is under the tape.  To be viewed only 
after you have named your offer price on the other 
side.
Circle the appropriate amount and print your name so 
we can pay you.
My offer price is below the posted price.
Pay me the posted price of $_______________.
My offer price is above the posted price. 
Pay me $ 2.00.
Name _____________________________________
10 
 
 
In this choice situation, a subject who prefers more money to less has a dominant strategy 
of stating $2 as an offer price.  Failure to state $2 reflects a mistake. A subject offering a price 
higher than $2 will never receive more and can receive less for the card than a subject offering 
$2.  If the subject offers $2 for the card, he receives $2 if the random posted price is less than or 
equal to $2 but he receives the posted price whenever the posted price is above $2. Thus, 
subjects who offer the card at values strictly greater than $2 redeem the card at $2 when the 
posted price is above $2 but below the subject’s offer price.  Regardless of the probabilities of 
various draws, a failure to offer $2 means that subject simply failed to take the opportunity to 
receive extra money when available and we know that is something that the subjects do not want 
to do.  The decision must rest on a misconception, mistake or confusion. 
To verify that the failure to take money when available was a mistake the experiment 
included a repeat decision in which subjects are given the opportunity to correct the mistake 
when faced with a nearly identical choice.  After the subject completes the question on the back 
of the card, which reinforces attention on the rules and the possible outcomes, the subject turns 
the card in.  After the first cards are collected the subjects are given another card exactly like the 
first, except the $݌̅ on the second card is usually different from the $݌̅ on the first card but due to 
the randomness they are sometimes the same. Again, the correct response if the subject 
understands the options correctly is to offer a price of $2.  
The application of BDM in this environment differs from typical applications along four 
dimensions.  First, unlike the typical application of BDM we know the preference that should be 
revealed.  The card has a clear cash value stated in the first sentence which is further explained 
on the front of the card, and it has no other outside value.  It has no intrinsic value.  The subject 
is acting in isolation so there is no value associated with a social context. The card has no 
enhancement values that might be created by using words like “gift”. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the difference between the card and cash is no different than the difference between 
two five dollar bills and one ten dollar bill, an indifference that is expressed daily in transactions.  
Thus, the analysis proceeds on the proposition that the value of the card to the subject is 
objectively known to be $2, allowing a test of whether or not the BDM produced an accurate 
preference measurement.  Second, the choice is repeated with the same structure of preference, 
an object valued at $2, only with a randomly determined different upper limit of the posted price 
11 
 
– basically a repeated measurement of the same preference using the same instructions. Third, 
the answers to the questions on the back of the card provide evidence of how the subject 
perceived the task.  
The fourth dimension is important.  The nature of the questions answered at the 
completion of the first card could expose the subject to evidence that the subject made a mistake. 
If the posted price was above $2 and below the subject’s offer price he can see that by stating a 
lower price he would have received more money.  Thus the subject is exposed to evidence of a 
possible mistake.  If the choice was indeed a mistake as opposed to an accurate statement of 
preference, and the subject perceives this as a mistake, then the subject would change behavior in 
the direction of a stated price of $2.  Thus, the experimental design can produce evidence of 
failure of game form recognition.  With the data in hand we then ask if the choice is better 
explained as mistake due to a failure of game form recognition or by a theory of constructed 
preference based on a process of framing. That examination is contained in Section VI. 
 
IV. Experimental Procedures  
 
 
Because the experiment was so brief we conducted the experiment during class time, rather than 
recruiting volunteers to attend a lab session. In particular, 245 subjects participated during the 
first 10 minutes of seven sections of Purdue University microeconomics principles classes that 
were not taught by the experimenters. One of the experimenters, assisted by 2 or 3 research 
assistants, simply passed out (face up, shown on the left side of the figure) the decision cards 
shown in Figure 2. Although all cards indicated an induced and known “face value” of $2, it was 
not common knowledge that all cards had the same face value. The experimenter orally 
described this classroom activity as a “simple exercise to understand how people make 
decisions.” He asked subjects not to talk, and to read the front of the card themselves and 
indicate their offer price carefully since the money they receive can depend on their answer. 
They were told to turn over the card after indicating this price, look under the taped tab, and 
write the amount they should be paid. The class sizes were relatively small (30 to 40 students) in 
arena-style seating, and the experimenter and assistants observed subjects carefully and none 
were seen violating the experiment rules. 
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Once all cards were collected, a second card was passed out. This second decision round 
was not announced in advance.10 The card was identical to the first, except that it was a different 
color and the maximum posted price varied randomly across subjects. Subjects were paid for 
both card answers, using sealed envelopes of cash distributed when class was dismissed. 
Earnings ranged between $3.05 and $13.66, with an average of $6.11 per subject. 
The cards were identical except for the range for the uniformly-distributed random posted 
price. The minimum posted price was always $0, but the maximum posted price was $4, $5, $6, 
$7, or $8. Each of these ranges was assigned one-fifth of the cards. While the range does not 
affect the theoretical incentive-compatibility of the BDM mechanism, as discussed in Section VI 
it does influence the expected payoff consequences of suboptimal offer prices.  
 
V. Results: Data Patterns 
 
 
The prominent patterns of the data are stated here as a series of results relevant for the 
implications to be addressed in the subsequent sections.  While the limited reliability of the BDM 
is of general interest, it has already been well-documented, including in many of the studies 
noted above in footnote 9. The first two results indicate that the proportion of optimal choices 
($2) is not high but increases substantially on the second choice. The third, fourth, and fifth 
results summarize the relationship between the pattern of “optimal” choices, experience and 
subsequent choice. 
 
Result 1: With simple instructions and no training or feedback, the BDM does not provide 
reliable measures of preferences for the induced-value object. 
Support: Figure 3A displays the distribution of offer prices chosen by the 245 subjects during 
the first round, pooling across the maximum offer price treatments. Only 41 out of the 245 (16.7 
percent) subjects chose offers within 5 cents of the $2 true value. A greater fraction of subjects 
chose offers near $3 and near $4 than near the optimal offer. These large deviations from the 
                                                 
10 The data were collected on three different dates over 15 weeks. None of the main data patterns, such as the 
frequency of optimal offer prices in either round or the increase in optimal offers from round one to round two, are 
different across dates. This suggests that little information about the experiment “leaked” out to affect choices made 
by later subjects, which is not surprising for this large campus of nearly 40,000 students. 
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induced value of $2 are similar to the minimal information treatment in Irwin et al. (1998), in 
which subjects were not given information about how the BDM mechanism operates. 
 
 
 
 
Result 2: A second round of decisions (including subjects re-reading the instructions and after 
receiving feedback) nearly doubles the number of subjects stating the correct valuation. 
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Support: Figure 3B shows that the number of subjects indicating an offer price within 5 cents of 
the $2 true value increases to 76 out of 244 (31.1 percent) on the second, repeat decision.11 The 
data strongly reject the null hypothesis that the rate that subjects state an offer price within 5 
cents of $2 is equal on the first and second decisions (Fisher’s exact test p-value<0.01).12 
 
Result 3: Subjects that chose the theoretically optimal offer price (near $2) on the first card also 
usually choose the theoretically optimal offer price on the second card.  Subjects who did not 
choose optimally on the first card tend to choose a different offer price on the second card. 
Support: Of the 244 subjects, 203 did not choose the theoretical optimum (within 5 cents of $2) 
on the first card.  Of these 203, 159 (78%) chose a different offer price on the second card and 44 
(22%) indicated the same offer price. Of the 244 subjects, 41 chose near $2 on the first card. Of 
these 41, 35 (85%) chose the same offer price and 6 (15%) chose a different offer price on the 
second card. The hypothesis that the stability of choice is the same for those who chose 
optimally and those who did not choose optimally on the first card is strongly rejected (Fisher’s 
exact test p-value<0.01). 
These results demonstrate that the misconceptions subjects apparently have about the 
BDM procedure are distinct from potential framing effects, which we elaborate in the next 
section. One possible interpretation is that the frame changes when subjects observe different 
upper limits of the posted price and the frame is the same if the upper limit of the posted price 
remains the same. However, many subjects who received the exact same upper limit in the two 
rounds and did not choose optimally in the first round changed their offer price in the second 
round. In particular, 26 of the 46 subjects (57%) who observed the same upper bound (and thus 
the exact same frame) in rounds 1 and 2 but who did not offer within 5 cents of $2 in the first 
round changed their offer in the second round. While non-optimal subjects who received a 
different upper limit in the two rounds changed their offer price more frequently (133 out of 157, 
85%), framing theory does not explain the frequent change in behavior even when the frame 
stayed the same across rounds. Moreover, those subjects who chose optimally (presumably those 
                                                 
11 The number of observations decreases to 244 on the second decision because one subject did not write an offer 
price on his second card. 
12 This result is robust to using alternative thresholds, such as offer prices exactly equal to $2, or 10 or 25 cents 
within $2. The number of offers “close” to $2 on the second decision is 76 regardless of whether the threshold to 
define “close” is 5 or 25 cents because the 14 offers near but not equal to $2 were all within 2 cents of $2. (Others 
were at least 50 cents away from $2).  The data suggest no evidence of a “status quo” bias or “endowment effect” 
beyond what might be attributed to the well-known transaction cost.  
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with no misconceptions) tend to have stable choices, even when the frame (interpreted as the 
random price upper bound) changes.  
Result 4 illustrates data patterns that could be attributed to a theory of framing based on 
this interpretation that the random price upper bound determines the frame.  Result 5 provides 
more direct evidence that subjects learn across rounds and how the feedback subjects receive at 
the end of round 1 affects how they adjust their offer price in round 2.  These two features of the 
data play an important role in determining the nature of game form misconceptions. 
 
Result 4: For both the first and second round choices the pattern of non-optimal price offers are 
related to the maximum of the posted price range. 
Support: Table 1 summarizes the mean price offers for each of the 5 upper bounds in the two 
rounds for offers not within 5 cents of $2. The trend is for offers and standard errors to increase 
as the upper bound increases, with only a couple of exceptions. Median offers (not shown) also 
generally increase with the upper bound. Table 2 indicates that the differences in offers for 
different upper bounds is statistically significant in most pairwise tests, similar to findings in 
Bohm et al. (1997). The frequency that subjects offer near $2 is not systematically related to the 
upper bound. 
 
Table 1: Mean Price Offers for Each Posted Price Range Maximum, Excluding Offers 
within 5 Cents of $2 
 
Panel A: Round 1 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] Range [0, $8] 
Mean Offer 2.98 3.35 3.50 3.93 3.80 
(Std. Error) (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.21) 
Observations 45 39 39 40 41 
Percent Offer 
$2±0.05 10% 19% 22% 17% 16% 
 
Panel B: Round 2 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] Range [0, $8] 
Mean Offer 2.73 3.08 3.37 3.85 4.16 
(Std. Error) (0.13) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.36) 
Observations 32 35 28 41 32 
Percent Offer 
$2±0.05 32% 27% 44% 18% 35% 
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Table 2: Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Tests Comparing Offers for Different Posted Price Ranges 
 
Panel A: Round 1 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] 
Range [0, $5] 0.013    
Range [0, $6] 0.001 0.176   
Range [0, $7] 0.000 0.007 0.135  
Range [0, $8] 0.000 0.003 0.076 0.784 
 
Panel B: Round 2 
 Range [0, $4] Range [0, $5] Range [0, $6] Range [0, $7] 
Range [0, $5] 0.007    
Range [0, $6] 0.001 0.474   
Range [0, $7] 0.000 0.005 0.056  
Range [0, $8] 0.000 0.007 0.040 0.423 
Note: Tests exclude offers within 5 cents of $2. Table entries denote p-values for two-tailed 
Wilcoxon tests. 
 
Result 5: Subjects who were “exposed” to their mistake (in the sense that a different offer 
amount would have increased their payoff) were more likely to choose a correct offer in round 2. 
Support: One problem with the BDM is that incorrect offer prices are financially punished 
infrequently (Harrison, 1992). In the present context, for example, if a subject states an offer 
price for the card that is greater than $2 but the random posted price exceeds this offer price, then 
this subject could not have increased her payment by choosing any other offer. We define a 
subject as “exposed” to her mistake if an alternative offer could have increased her payment. 
This occurs when the posted price is greater than $2 but less than the subject’s offer price, or 
when the posted price is less than $2 but greater than the subject’s offer. Only 57 of the 204 
subjects (28 percent) who incorrectly offered an amount more than 5 cents away from $2 in 
round 1 were exposed to their mistake. Table 3 displays the directional shift in offers from round 
1 to round 2 for those subjects who were exposed to their mistake and those who were not 
exposed. Fisher’s exact tests reveal that those who were exposed were significantly more likely 
to jump to $2 (p-value=0.049) and significantly less likely to move even further away from $2 
(p-value=0.024) on round 2.13 
                                                 
13 These statistical tests are based on a transformation of the offers to the ratio (offer-$2)/(݌̅ -$2), where ݌̅ is the 
maximum random posted price draw, since subjects might have faced two different upper bounds and the adjustment 
relative to the optimum can be sensitive to this maximum possible price. Results are similar when defining 
movements using the raw offers, rather than with this normalization, although the p-value for the difference in 
propensity to move away from $2 becomes 0.082. 
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Table 3: Adjustment of Round 1 to Round 2 Offer Prices for Subjects Choosing Incorrectly 
on Round 1 
 Exposed to Round 1 Error Not Exposed to Round 1 Error 
Total Subjects 57 (100%) 146 (100%) 
Move Onto Optimum ($2) 16 (28%) 24 (16%) 
Move Towards Optimum 24 (42%) 57 (39%) 
Choose Same Offer Ratio 9 (16%) 24 (16%) 
Move Away From Optimum 8 (14%) 41 (28%) 
Note: Movements are based on offer ratio=(offer-$2)/(݌̅ -$2), where ݌̅ is the maximum random 
posted price draw.  
 
 Figure 4 illustrates the movements toward and away from the optimal $2 offer using the 
ratio=(offer-$2)/(݌̅ -$2), where ݌̅ is the maximum random posted price draw. By construction of 
this ratio, 0 is the optimum. No “bubbles” are on the vertical axis because this figure excludes 
the 41 subjects who chose the optimal offer in round 1. (As already noted, those subjects nearly 
always chose optimally in round 2 as well.) Bubbles on the 45-degree line indicate subjects who 
chose offers to maintain a consistent ratio in both rounds. (The largest bubble representing the 
most subjects is at (0.5, 0.5), and 62 subjects chose offers that led to a ratio of 0.5 on at least one 
of the rounds. This is an important ratio discussed in the next section.) Bubbles below the 45-
degree line usually indicate movements toward the optimal ratio of 0, and bubbles above the 45-
degree line indicate movements away from the optimal offer. Panel A shows how offers change 
among subjects who were not exposed to their error, and they are scattered both above and below 
the 45-degree line. By contrast, Panel B indicates a more systematic movement among subjects 
exposed to their error, below the 45-degree line and towards or onto the optimal ratio of 0. 
 
VI. Results: Models 
 
Three classes of general theories can be tested and compared for analysis of our experimental 
results: A. theories based on framing; B. theories based on task understanding but with noise; C. 
theories based on specific game form misconceptions.  Theories within a class tend to rest on the 
same or similar basic principles but the basic principles differ across classes.  Our data exhibit 
support for prominent features of framing theories, which appears to be inconsistent with the 
claim (originally offered in Kahneman et al. 1990) that the preference for the induced value card 
is objective, constant and known.  If the preference was not known, one could easily conclude 
that the preference for the commodities resulted from framing. However, a close examination of 
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Figure 4, Panel A: Offer Ratios and Changes for Subjects Not Exposed to Round 1 Error 
 
Figure 4, Panel B: Offer Ratios and Changes for Subjects Exposed to Round 1 Error
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the choices demonstrates that a case for framing is not convincing. The data are better and more 
completely explained by a mixture of some subjects who understand the BDM mechanism and 
submit optimal offers and others who have a specific type of game form misconception. A 
discussion of the general theory of framing is reserved for Section VII. 
 
A. Theories of Framing   
Four theories suggested by framing are applicable in our experiment, in the sense that the data 
exhibit patterns often interpreted as confirming evidence for framing.  We are not asserting that 
the choices exhibited in the experiment represent preferences constructed through a framing 
process, as we agree with the insights from Kahneman et al. cited above that this should not be 
the case for induced value items.  The point is that while the data are consistent with the intuition 
drawn from those theories, a completely different assessment emerges when comparing these 
patterns to theories of mistakes stemming from game form misconceptions. The interpretations 
of preferences are different when the role of perceptions and mistakes are considered as an 
alternative theory. Before turning to that assessment, consider first the four theories suggested by 
framing listed below. Although they have differing origins, their empirical implications are 
similar so they are not distinguishable for this simple experiment. 
 Endowment effect/reference points:  Those names suggest that the data reflect a special 
factor such as the “endowment” or a “reference point” from which utility losses loom 
greater than gains.  This leads to a “kink” in the utility function at the endowment, the 
reference point in this frame, so the asking price for the item (willingness to accept) is 
greater than the buying price (willingness to pay). According to framing theory, 
possession (ownership) of the object creates a sense of loss should the object be sold or 
given up in exchange.  Since the object is a card worth $2 some might question whether 
the necessary “sense of ownership” will develop, and whether or not an “endowment 
effect” will be observed.  However, the data clearly show BDM measurements of 
willingness to accept that are substantially more than $2.  These patterns are reported in 
Results 1, 2, and 4.  If subjects’ willingness to pay for a $2 card is near this induced value 
(as in Irwin et al., 1998) or less than $2 (as observed for non-induced value objects), it 
seems reasonable to conjecture that the WTA we have documented is greater than the 
WTP. In this case an “endowment effect” would be observed, just as the theory predicts 
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(Kahneman et al., 1990, 2008; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).  Furthermore, one might 
conclude that sellers require compensation for the consumption value of the ticket plus 
additional value for the loss of the ticket, due to loss aversion, creating a positive 
relationship between the value of the ticket and the upper bound of the draw. Indeed, 
these data are consistent with what some would describe as a “widely observed” pattern 
in the literature.14  Thus, whether or not an endowment effect applies can be debated but 
it is clear that our data have properties that are predicted by the theory. 
 Anchor and adjustment: This theory holds that the frame centers the subject’s focus on 
the prominent feature of the good and assesses the value, and then creates a value of the 
good by adjusting for other features (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). A reasonable assumption is that the prominent feature of the BDM in 
our application is the upper bound of the posted price range. Subjects could focus 
attention on the maximum possible value and then construct their preference through an 
adjustment downward based on probabilities or characteristics of the card, but with an 
incomplete adjustment that might not consider the strategic issues.  The result would tend 
to be a value above $2 as is observed and the positive relationship between the upper 
bound and the offers reported in Result 4 could be interpreted as further support. 
 Attraction to the maximum: Similar to anchoring, this theory holds that a psychological 
“pull” to the maximum payoff (posted price range) draws decisions to it (Urbancic, 
2011). The maximum serves as a reference point used for the construction of a preference 
that depends on the distribution governing the outcomes in the BDM.  Presumably this 
preference is accurately measured by the BDM mechanism. The preference will be 
influenced by the location of the maximum, which is consistent with Result 4.  
 Expectations of a trade (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006): Anticipating selling the item 
means losing the item for a gain in money.  Losses loom greater than gains, and this 
motivates a high offer price especially when the anticipated selling price of the item is 
high.  While the expectations of trading are not manipulated or directly observed in our 
experiment, Kőszegi and Rabin’s model makes predictions that depend on the 
assumptions made about expectations for trades.  In particular, they note that if the 
                                                 
14 For example, Knetsch et al. (2001, page 257) state that “The endowment effect and loss aversion have been 
among the most robust findings of the psychology of decision making. People commonly value losses much more 
than commensurate gains…” 
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subject does not expect to trade then a loss aversion effect will be observed.  However if 
the subject does expect to trade then the effect would depend on the subject expectations. 
An initial interpretation of our data is that the subjects expect not to trade and that the 
predictions of the Kőszegi and Rabin model are supported given the high offer prices 
stated by subjects.15 Results 1, 2 and 4 contain the appropriate data. 
 
Theories of framing appear to be consistent with parts of the behavior observed in the 
experiment. Other results do not support framing theory. Result 3 demonstrates that subjects who 
choose according to classical theory tend to repeat this choice. But contrary to framing theory 
that means that they are not influenced by a change in frame (as the change in upper limit that 
many experienced could be interpreted). More importantly, based on the convention of defining 
choices as preferences, the theories are reporting to have identified and measured a preference 
contrary to what was induced. As was established in Section III, we know that the true 
preference for the card is $2 but framing theories suggest that the measured preferences differ 
from $2.  Result 4 demonstrates that subjects who exhibit the features exhibited by theories of 
framing tend to be those that change their choice when given the same option again.  Contrary to 
framing theory, however, part of Result 3 indicates that for many subjects the frame remains the 
same but the choice changes. Subjects exposed to their possible misconception tend to correct it 
in the direction predicted by classical theory (Result 5) onto or towards the optimal choice. The 
patterns of choices across rounds (Results 3 and 5) are more consistent with learning than 
framing. 
 
B.  An Optimal Model with Noise 
Over two decades ago Harrison (1992) highlighted the weak incentives provided by the BDM for 
truthful revelation of preferences, in the context of his well-known “flat payoff” critique of 
preference measurement; see also Irwin et al. (1998). Some subjects may understand the 
instructions and the BDM task but they could make errors, and a key observation is that errors 
are very “cheap” in the BDM because they often are not penalized through financial losses. As 
                                                 
15 While the data from the experiment can be interpreted as support for Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) our experiment is 
clearly not the way to test their model. Indeed like other framing based theories their theory does not predict an 
endowment effect in our setting for the reasons given by Kahneman et al. (1990) that endowment effects should not 
occur for induced value objects. Nevertheless, the high average WTA observed in our data could be interpreted as 
evidence for an endowment effect in the absence of the further analysis we apply below in Section VI.C.   
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already documented, in the present dataset only 28 percent of subjects who offer more than 5 
cents away from the correct offer of $2 suffered any monetary cost from their suboptimal offer. 
Moreover, the likelihood of being exposed to a mistake is lower as the upper range of the random 
price distribution increases, and the expected cost of an error of any given size is smaller as the 
range of random price draws increases.  
In particular, the expected loss from a suboptimal offer can be calculated as follows: 
Denote the offer price chosen by the subject as b and the randomly-drawn posted price as 
݌~ܷሾ0, ݌̅ሿ with maximum ݌̅ ∈ ሼ4, 5, 6, 7, 8ሽ. The expected payoff is 
E[π] = 2*prob(b>p) + E(p|p>b)prob(p>b). For the uniform distribution16 this simplifies to 
 Eሾߨሿ ൌ 1݌̅ ቈ2ܾ ൅
݌̅ଶ െ ܾଶ
2 ቉ (1)
This can be differenced from the expected payoff earned when choosing the optimal offer price 
b*=2 to calculate the expected loss for any offer price other than the optimal offer price of $2, 
given ݌̅.  
For example, consider a subject indicating a suboptimal offer price of $3.00. The 
likelihood that this subject will see a random draw between $2 and $3 resulting in a loss relative 
to the correct offer price of $2 is 1/8 when the range is [$0, $8] but is 1/4 when the range is [$0, 
$4]. The expected loss from this suboptimal offer price is very small for both ranges, but it is 
twice as great when the random posted price ranges between [$0, $4], 12.5 cents, rather than [$0, 
$8], 6.25 cents. This suggests that more errors (and thus higher average offer prices) will occur 
for higher upper bounds for the random price draws, as already documented in the data (Result 
4). Note that this is simply a model of random mistakes, which are more likely to occur when 
they are less costly. This is not a systematic misconception of the BDM mechanism. In what 
follows we will refer to this as the “optimal” or “correct” model with noise.17 
                                                 
16 Note that the brief instructions on the decision card did not state that the randomly-posted price was drawn from 
the uniform distribution, since the exact distribution is not relevant for the incentive-compatible properties of the 
BDM. Calculation of the expected payoff from each offer does require an assumption for this distribution, and it 
seems plausible for many subjects to assume the uniform distribution that was actually used, just as Bayesian 
analysis often assumes a uniform (non-informative) prior based on the principle of indifference. 
17 Given the importance of risk preferences in the “flat payoff” literature, it seems sensible to generalize the 
objective function beyond risk neutrality. We considered including constant relative risk aversion in our model 
estimates reported below, but found that the best fitting parameters featured implausible levels of risk aversion for 
the optimal model with noise and did not reject risk neutrality for the first-price auction misconception model 
described in the next subsection. As an alternative it would be valuable to determine how risk aversion varies across 
subjects and is related to observables (e.g., as in Harrison (1990) and Harrison and Rutström (2008)), but we have 
too few choices per subject for such analysis and did not collect socio-demographic data. 
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C. Failure of Game Form Recognition 
The theory of game form misconception in this context holds that the patterns of data are not due 
a preference that evolved from framing but are due to mistakes. Moreover, the mistakes are not 
simply random departures from a correct understanding of the experimental task, but rather arise 
from a misconception of the rules of the BDM. In order to make a case that the choices reflect a 
systematic, fundamental mistake the mistake itself is described and stated in a form that yields 
testable predictions that are comparable to the predictions of other possible models.  Of course, 
in the absence of specific, testable predictions the concept of a mistake can be applied to explain 
any pattern of choices. 
Although the results indicate that some subjects chose price offers of $2 and apparently 
understood the BDM mechanism, other subjects filled out their cards incorrectly and this 
suggested a specific type of misconception. Recall that subjects were asked to write on their card 
the amount they should be paid after looking under an opaque tab covering their random offer 
price. Twenty-nine of the subjects indicated that they should be paid their offer price even when 
their offer price was less than the randomly-drawn posted price on their decision card. This does 
not appear to be a deliberate “mistake” because they would earn more by correctly indicating 
that they should be paid the drawn random price. (We noticed these mistakes when viewing their 
cards to prepare the money payment envelopes, and paid subjects the correct, higher amount.) 
These subjects appear to believe the payment mechanism is similar to a first price procurement 
auction in which the lowest offer wins and is paid the offer price. An additional 82 subjects may 
have had this first-price auction misconception, but our data do not directly reveal it because on 
both of their cards their offer was above the drawn random price.18,19 
This type of mistake suggests that some subjects believe that the buyer accepts the lower 
                                                 
18 These 82 subjects include two who offer the optimal $2, but since their drawn random offer price was less than $2 
we do not know whether they had a misconception. These offers are possible in the misconception model with noise 
developed in this section. 
19 Additional types of possible game form misconceptions are suggested by the data but were so sparse in the data 
that we do not pursue them.  A few subjects seemed to think that they would be paid their offer independent of the 
posted price and thus stated asking prices equal to the maximum of the range. A few other subjects appeared to think 
that they only received a payment if their asking price was below the posted price and thus stated an asking price 
below $2. The prominence of $4 among the price offer distributions, especially when inexperienced (Figure 3A) 
suggests that other misconceptions with an optimal offer of $4 are possible; the data suggest, however, that 
misconceptions that imply a positive relationship between the offer and the maximum of the random price 
distribution (Table 2) are more common. 
      One can also imagine misconceptions emerging from the task itself.  A subject faced with such a simple task as 
selling $2 for $2 might speculate in what the experimenter’s had in mind.   We are unable to associate that 
possibility with any specific form of behavior that might affect our analysis or conclusions. 
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price, where the subject’s offer price is in competition with the random posted price; and if they 
do not win this competition (i.e., if they do not have the lower price) then they are paid the $2 
value on the retained card. In other words, they perceive their expected payoff to be  
 Eሾߨሿ′ = 2prob(b>p) + bprob(p>b), (2) 
where again the offer price chosen by the subject is b and the randomly-drawn posted price is 
݌~ܷሾ0, ݌̅ሿ. (The mistake here is that b replaces the correct E(p|p>b) in the second term of the 
expression.) We developed this alternative misconception model following the data collection 
when we observed directly the errors subjects made when filling out their payment cards. If we 
had we anticipated this first-price auction misconception we could have explained to subjects the 
distribution of the random offer price since it affects the expected payoffs for different price 
offers, even though it does not affect the incentive properties of the BDM.20 For the uniform 
distribution, which is a reasonable assumption without additional prior information, the expected 
payoff simplifies to  
 Eሾߨሿᇱ ൌ 1݌̅ ሾ2ܾ ൅ ܾሺ݌̅ െ ܾሻሿ 
(3)
If the subject maximizes this incorrect expected payoff expression with respect to the offer b, 
then he will set ܾ′ = 1 + 0.5݌̅. Importantly, this incorrect offer depends positively on the 
maximum price drawn in the random offer distribution, similar to the random mistake in the 
optimal model with noise. Also, note that this offer function results in a constant ratio for  
(ܾ′-$2)/(݌̅ -$2)=0.5, which appears prominently in Figure 4 among those offers not near $2. 
 To differentiate empirically between the simple “optimal model with noise” and the “first 
price misconception” explanations in the data, we turn to a familiar quantal choice framework in 
which agents seek to maximize their (perceived) expected payoff, but make (Luce-McFadden) 
logit errors: 
 ܲݎ݋ܾሺ݋݂݂݁ݎ ൌ ௝ܾሻ ൌ ݁
ఒாሾగ|௕ೕሿ
∑ ݁ఒாሾగ|௕ೖሿ௡௞ୀଵ  (4)
Less costly errors (in terms of perceived expected payoffs) are more likely than more costly 
errors. The  term indicates how sensitive subjects are to differences in their expected payoffs. 
For =0 subjects are completely insensitive and choose all feasible offers with equal probability. 
                                                 
20  Such an intervention is accompanied by a risk that misconceptions are compounded through the subjective 
probabilities.  See, for example the “question-influenced beliefs” conjecture of Plott and Zeiler (2011).  
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As →∞ the choice model fits perfectly with no error. Of course, we do not claim that all 
subjects should be classified as making choices in one way or another; instead, we use standard 
maximum likelihood methods to fit the data pooled across subjects to the two models and 
estimate the  that best approximates the aggregate behavior. Higher levels of  indicate a better 
fit—requiring less noise to characterize subject choices according to that particular model. 
Below we also estimate a mixture model to determine what fraction of offers is best 
approximated by each model. 
 The log-likelihood, conditional on the first-price misconception (denoted with a 1st 
superscript), depends on the estimated payoff sensitivity 1st and the observed choices yi: 
 ln ܮଵ௦௧ሺߣଵ௦௧; ݕ௜ሻ ൌ ෍ln ݈௜ଵ௦௧ ൌ ෍lnሼݕ௜݁ఒభೞ೟ாሾగ|௕ೕሿᇱ/Σ
௜௜
݁ఒభೞ೟ாሾగ|௕ೖሿ′ሽ (5)
where yi is an indicator for offer i being in a bin within five cents of bj.21 Similarly, the 
conditional log-likelihood based on the assumption that the optimal and correct model is true 
(denoted with an OPT superscript) is 
 ln ܮை௉்ሺߣை௉்; ݕ௜ሻ ൌ ෍ln ݈௜ை௉் ൌ ෍lnሼݕ௜݁ఒೀು೅ாሾగ|௕ೕሿ/Σ
௜௜
݁ఒೀು೅ாሾగ|௕ೖሿሽ (6)
Note that other than the different payoff sensitivity parameters, these log-likelihoods differ only 
in whether the correct expected payoff expression E[] from eq. (1) or the misconceived 
expected payoff expression E[]' from eq. (3) is used. 
 
Result 6 : Among the subjects who do not choose offers within 5 cents of the correct offer of $2, 
the first price misconception model provides a better overall fit than the optimal choice model 
augmented with logit errors, and a much higher fraction of these offers are more consistent with 
the first price misconception model. 
Support: Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the payoff sensitivity 
parameters  along with bootstrapped standard errors and 90 percent confidence intervals. The 
first column is based on all the data and indicates some small differences in fit between the two 
models, but for the Round 1 offers the log-likelihood is considerably higher for the first price 
misconception model. The confidence intervals for overlap in that first column, however, and 
                                                 
21 For tractability in the estimation, we aggregate the offer data into 10-cent bins to reduce the dimension of the 
probability vector by one order of magnitude. 
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subjects who offer the correct $2 are unlikely to have the first price misconception or make 
errors. The second column therefore excludes subjects who submitted offers within 5 cents of $2, 
and here the estimated payoff sensitivity terms diverge significantly. For both rounds the 
point estimates are more than three times higher for the misconception model than for the 
optimal model with noise, the confidence intervals are quite different, and the log-likelihood is 
substantially higher for the misconception model. This indicates that while the subjects who do 
not submit offers of $2 do not have the correct idea about the mechanism, they are not merely 
making random errors that are related to the economic cost of the errors. Their offers are better 
characterized by the first price misconception model augmented with a modest level of decision 
error. Finally, the rightmost column displays estimates for the 111 subjects who are most likely 
 
Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logit Choice Error Parameter  for Optimal 
and First Price Auction Misconception Models 
 
Model 
 
All Data 
Excluding Offers 
within 5 cents of $2 
Subjects revealing miscon-
ception, or possibly holding it 
Round 1    
Optimal Model OPT 0.99 0.56 0.48 
(standard error) (0.149) (0.130) (0.141) 
[90% confidence] [0.81, 1.26] [0.34, 0.73] [0.25, 0.74] 
observations n=245 n=204 n=111 
Log Likelihood -985.4 -826.8 -449.4 
First Price Auction 
Misconception Model 1st 
 
1.18 
 
1.83 
 
3.05 
(standard error) (0.184) (0.408) (0.624) 
[90% confidence] [0.88, 1.49] [1.30, 2.56] [2.13, 4.20] 
observations n=245 n=204 n=111 
Log Likelihood -954.2 -769.3 -398.2 
Round 2    
Optimal Model OPT 1.12 0.30 0.01 
(standard error) (0.244) (0.164) (0.166) 
[90% confidence] [0.82, 1.51] [0.09, 0.49] [0, 0.41] 
observations n=244 n=168 n=111 
Log Likelihood -979.7 -685.7 -451.6 
First Price Auction 
Misconception Model 1st 
 
0.59 
 
1.03 
 
1.71 
(standard error) (0.115) (0.239) (0.273) 
[90% confidence] [0.39, 0.82] [0.72, 1.53] [1.34, 2.23] 
observations n=244 n=168 n=111 
Log Likelihood -980.5 -660.9 -420.0 
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to have the misconception, either because they reveal it directly on their decision cards (n=29) or 
because on both of their cards their offer was above the drawn random price so we cannot rule 
out this type of misconception (n=82). Obviously the misconception model fits much better for 
this subset of subjects. 
 Table 5 reports estimates for a finite mixture model that estimates a pooled payoff 
sensitivity parameter and the probability  that the optimal model or the first price 
misconception model best describes the data (Harrison and Ruström, 2009). The grand likelihood 
that combines the two models is constructed as a probability weighted average of the conditional 
likelihoods, where  denotes the probability that the (error-augmented) first price 
misconception model is correct:22  
 ln ܮሺߣ, ߠெ; ݕ௜ሻ ൌ ෍lnሼሺ1 െ ߠெሻ ݈௜ை௉் ൅ ߠெ݈௜ଵ௦௧ሽ
௜
 (7)
The results in column (1) show that nearly two-thirds of all the offers are more consistent with 
the misconception in Round 1. The probability that an offer is more consistent with the 
misconception model is estimated reasonably accurately, and for Round 1 the 90% confidence 
interval never includes an equal likelihood of the two models (i.e., =0.5). Offers are better 
approximated by the first price misconception model, although this model predicts offers that 
exceed observed mean offers when the maximum random price takes on its highest values. 
 Columns (2) and (3) allow the mixture probability  to be a linear function of dummy 
variables corresponding to the different subsets of subjects considered in the different columns of 
Table 4. A dummy variable D picks up the increase in the probability of the misconception for 
subjects who either offer a price that differs by more than 5 cents from $2 (column 2) or who 
reveal or may have the first price misconception (column 3), as =+D. The omitted case 
(captured by the intercept ) represents the misconception probability for subjects who submit 
offers at or near $2 or who reveal that they do not have a misconception. These subjects are best 
classified by the optimal model; for the others the  estimates indicate that the likelihood of a 
misconception is highly significant.23 
                                                 
22 This approach assumes that any offer can come from both models, but it includes the boundary case where one 
model or the other completely generates the offer. Alternative approaches and interpretations are possible (El-Gamal 
and Grether, 1995). 
23 While in principle it is possible to combine the two categories with two dummy variables into one regression, 
there is considerable overlap between the subjects who do not offer near $2 and who may have the first price 
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Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Finite Mixture Model Logit Choice Error 
Parameter  and Likelihood of First Price Auction Misconception Model M 
 
Model 
  
(1) 
Misconception
(2) 
Likelihood =+D  
(3) 
Round 1    
Payoff Sensitivity  4.49 5.59 5.09 
(standard error) (0.839) (0.735) (0.787) 
[90% confidence] [3.41, 6.08] [4.51, 6.99] [3.77, 6.44] 
Misconception Prob M 0.65   
(standard error) (0.046)   
[90% confidence] [0.59, 0.74]   
Intercept Prob 0  0.00 0.41 
(standard error)  (0.00) (0.070) 
[90% confidence]  [0.00, 0.00] [0.31, 0.53] 
Dummy on Offers not on $2 1  0.85  
(standard error)  (0.033)  
[90% confidence]  [0.79, 0.89]  
Dummy on Possible Misconception 1   0.50 
(standard error)   (0.078) 
[90% confidence]   [0.37, 0.62] 
observations n=245 n=245 n=245 
Log Likelihood -932.4 -884.9 -913.1 
Round 2    
Payoff Sensitivity  2.65 4.39 2.40 
(standard error) (0.824) (0.948) (0.699) 
[90% confidence] [1.68, 4.67] [3.26, 6.25] [1.94, 4.45] 
Misconception Prob M 0.42   
(standard error) (0.059)   
[90% confidence] [0.34, 0.54]   
Intercept Prob 0  0.00 0.00 
(standard error)  (0.00) (0.028) 
[90% confidence]  [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.11] 
Dummy on Offers not on $2 1  0.76  
(standard error)  (0.052)  
[90% confidence]  [0.67, 0.85]  
Dummy on Possible Misconception 1   0.99 
(standard error)   (0.096) 
[90% confidence]   [0.71, 1.00] 
observations n=244 n=244 n=244 
Log Likelihood -962.5 -922.5 -934.2 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
misconception. This complicates the interpretation of the dummy variables. A specification with a full set of 
interactions also leaves some categories with a small number of cases, making their estimates unreliable. 
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On one hand, the comparison of models yields a consistent pattern of failure of 
unmodified revealed preference theory and of framing theories. The BDM does not result in an 
accurate measure of the known preference.  A direct application of revealed preference theory 
does not suggest a reason why.  Application of framing theories leads to a substantial 
misspecification of the preference. On the other hand, the theory of game form misconception 
proves helpful.  Close examination of the data demonstrates that the problem resides with the 
BDM.  The choices of many of these untrained subjects appear to be based on a misconception 
of the task.  They think that it is a first price auction rather than a second price auction.  That 
insight provides a key tool with which to apply the theory of game form misconception.  The 
subjects consist of at least two groups. One group understands the game form as a second price 
auction and behaves substantially as game theory predicts.  Another group has a misconception 
of the game form as a first price auction and under that model behaves substantially as game 
theory predicts. The mixture of these groups leads to a pattern of mean offers that might be 
expected from framing or endowment effects, even though classical “rational choice” models 
from auction theory give a reasonably accurate account. While repeated choice tends to alert 
some subjects about their misconception, the most powerful correction comes with exposure to 
their mistake and its associated cost.  
 
VII. Concluding Observations and Summary 
The experiment we report demonstrates the failure of game form recognition in the context of a 
very simple BDM preference measurement exercise.  Two general points follow from the 
demonstration. First, misconceptions should be taken seriously as an explanatory theory of 
choice even in controlled laboratory experiments conducted using simple measurement methods.  
Choices cannot be interpreted reliably as revealing preferences.  Second, the influence of context 
can be misinterpreted as evidence supporting a class of non-standard preferences because the 
data generated by the BDM can be mistakenly interpreted as a preference constructed through 
framing effects. In particular, the failure of game form recognition can masquerade as support for 
the theory of framing, such as preferences constructed from reference points.  In part, the 
problem can be traced to the foundations of the theory of framing where the failure of game form 
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recognition is incorrectly defined as a failure of rationality and as evidence of non-traditional 
forms of preferences. 
Our research strategy is to study commodities with an induced preference that is so 
obvious that there would seem to be nothing to test.  A dollar is worth a dollar.  Since we know 
the preference for the commodity, we can focus on the measurement method, its reliability and 
interpretations of the measurements through a comparison with the known preference.  Does the 
method accurately measure what it is designed to measure; or are other elements of the context 
inadvertently incorporated in the measurement?  Clearly, this experiment is only an example but 
it serves to demonstrate the existence of a mismeasurement problem that can accompany 
applications of the BDM.  
 The existence of mistakes causes no particularly new problems for the theory of revealed 
preference.  Many instances of mistakes and poor measurement of one form or another are 
addressed in the literature, and the addition of randomness can produce extremely powerful 
models (e.g., Echenique et al., 2011).  However, our experiment demonstrates that systematic 
mistakes can be incorrectly interpreted as special forms of preferences. Logic calls for either a 
specification of the mistake and a test for the mistake or for an improved method of 
measurement.  We were able to identify the mistake with some precision in our experiment and 
in other experiments the mistake might also be easy to specify. The example with the word 
“LEFT” in Figure 1 suggests that the concept of information might be useful in dealing with 
mistakes when attempting to reconcile competing theories. The choice from among the ovals 
does not reveal a fully informed preference until additional information is provided.24   
The simplicity of our experiment provides insights concerning the nature of preferences 
and the tension between standard preference theory and non-standard preference theory.  It also 
addresses the problem of rejectability of framing theory mentioned in Section II, that according 
to the theory, the process of observing can affect the observed.  Framing theory holds that the 
preference is influenced by the methods used to observe and measure it.   Consequently, 
experiments leading to a rejection of non-standard preferences can be dismissed as having 
inadvertently influenced the preference.   For example, previous experiments demonstrate that 
                                                 
24 Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) suggest that “information” is the theoretical tool that can account for mistakes while 
maintaining the classical theory of preference.  However, how information is presented can be a central issue. 
Information, when accompanied by “helpful hints” can be even more effective.  For example, adding horizontal 
black lines to Figure 1 above and below the puzzle-shaped figures can be interpreted as information, as can the 
helpful hint to look at the white parts and not the black puzzle-shaped figures.   
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when subjects are well trained on the features of the BDM, a WTA/WTP gap for mugs does not 
exist but when subjects are not well trained, the WTA/WTP gap for mugs is observed (Plott and 
Zeiler, 2005; Isoni et al., 2011). Kőszegi and Rabin dismiss those experiments and presumably 
the replications, based on a concern that the training prevents the formation of appropriate 
reference points.25 Kahneman asserts that by training subjects with the BDM, Plott and Zeiler 
were leading subjects to choose according to the theory preferred by the experimenter.26   Yet, 
the experiments reported here appear to suggest a WTA/WTP gap since the asking price for the 
card is above the known value.  The “gap” in our experiment reflects a mistake as opposed to a 
preference constructed from framing and the conditions under which it goes away cannot be 
attributed to experimental conditions that influence the frame and thus change a preference.  
The concepts of misconceptions and mistakes highlighted in this study break the crucial 
connection between preference and choice in framing theory. We know that the stated choice is a 
mistake because we induced an objective preference and the fact of a mistake is confirmed by the 
systematic reduction of the mistake across rounds. Since the choice reflects a misconception, 
rather than a preference, there is no support for a claim that the axiom of invariance is violated as 
the frame changes and there is no inconsistency with rational choice.  Choices that do not satisfy 
the Kahneman and Tversky property of invariance can be mistakes and thus need not reflect a 
non-standard preference based on framing theory. In fact, the theory of rational preference and 
choice, which framing theory seeks to reject, actually provides an explanation of our 
experimental results. The theory of bidding in first-price auctions explains part of the data and 
the dynamics of choice adjustment toward the optimal offer, through feedback and exposure to 
errors, explain more.  
                                                 
25 For instance, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, page 1142) argue “One interpretation of the rare exceptions to laboratory 
findings of the [endowment] effect, such as Plott and Zeiler [2005], is that they have successfully decoupled 
subjects’ expectations from their initial ownership status. Similarly, the field experiment by List [2003], which 
replicates the effect for inexperienced sports card collectors but finds that experienced collectors show a much 
smaller, insignificant effect, is consistent with our theory if more experienced traders come to expect a high 
probability of parting with items they have just acquired.” 
26 Kahneman (2011, p. 471) criticizes Plott and Zeiler (2005) because “they devised an elaborate training procedure 
in which participants experienced the roles of both buyers and sellers, and were explicitly taught to assess their true 
values… Psychologists would consider the method severely deficient, because it communicates to the participants a 
message of what the experimenters consider appropriate behavior, which happens to coincide with the 
experimenter’s theory.”  We find this claim by Kahneman puzzling.  The training process used by Plott and Zeiler 
concerns the method of measurement in order to reduce game form misconceptions, and not the preference for the 
objects being measured. Plott and Zeiler also included experiments in which the subject experience part of training 
was absent but were overlooked by Kahneman as were data in which subjects were presented with degenerate 
lotteries after training. See Plott and Zeiler (2011). 
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Framing effects are well-documented. By highlighting subject mistakes we are not 
suggesting that framing effects do not exist, but rather how they should be interpreted. 
Anomalous results such as those reported here may not occur only because of this particular 
measurement method, since other methods have also returned evidence consistent with frame-
influenced choices, including the possibility of frame-induced mistakes. Framing influences 
could also affect important choices in the field, especially those considered infrequently and by 
individuals with limited abilities to evaluate alternatives such as retirement portfolio and 
insurance choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Our results suggest that when choices appear 
inconsistent with standard theory a failure of game form recognition could be part of the 
explanation. Consequently, researchers and policy-makers should consider choices made in 
unfamiliar environments as possibly reflecting mistakes, and not as evidence for non-standard 
preferences that might be influenced by reference points or other factors associated with framing 
effects. Under this interpretation, policy interventions to reduce mistakes and misconceptions can 
be part of the process of aligning individuals’ choices with their own preferences. While frame-
induced mistakes are possible, so also are frame-induced mistake corrections. 
The issue of mistakes has important implications beyond the very simple experiment 
reported here.  In particular, some widely cited criticisms of standard economic theory suffer 
from limited robustness that could be due to mistakes.27 The variability of results reported in the 
literature is understandable if one accepts the evidence presented here that systematic 
misconceptions of the game form accompany the widely-used BDM preference elicitation 
method.  A root cause may be misconceptions related to game form together with a variety of 
BDM instructions used by different researchers. However, we hasten to point out that we have 
produced no general theory of game form misconceptions.  Indeed, since the nature of 
misconceptions is context dependent, falsifiability of any proposed general theory of the failure 
of game form recognition is problematic.  There is a need to state a specific theory of the 
misconception in each case.  
                                                 
27 For example, some WTA/WTP gaps go away with greater subject experience (Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Isoni et al., 
2011), anchoring and adjustment effects are much smaller in some studies (compare Fudenberg et al., 2012 to Ariely 
et al., 2003), and manipulations of expectations of a trade do not have predicted impacts on reference dependence 
(Goette et al., 2012).  More recently Heffetz and List (forthcoming) demonstrate that the assignment of commodities 
does not influence the preferences of the individual to whom they are assigned and is thus not associated with non-
standard preferences. 
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Can the BDM be developed to accommodate both the need to avoid game form 
misconceptions while also avoiding contaminating procedures from the point of view of framing 
theory? We have not addressed that question, and how it might be addressed depends on one’s 
understanding of framing and framing theory.28  Economics rests on the hypothesis that 
preferences exist, can be measured and that a clear distinction exists between a preference and a 
decision. The addition of random variables to model preferences from decision data such as the 
logit model used here are illustrations.  By contrast, the theory of framing appears to rest on the 
assumption that preferences cannot be known independent of the frame and perhaps are even 
created/constructed by the frame.  Thus, the constructed preference perspective of framing 
results in an unclear meaning of “preference measurement” and certainly leaves ambiguous the 
meaning of “improved measurement” since, according to the theory, the preference itself is 
influenced by the measurement process.  More training or detailed descriptions, including a 
summary of the incentive-compatibility of the BDM mechanism sometimes used in instructions, 
changes the frame and thus influences the preference according to framing theory. Thus, it might 
be impossible to determine if measurement is improved under the maintained assumption of 
framing theory.  
We were drawn to this research by a tension that exists in the literature. We conclude that 
the tension stems from a missing element of theory:  a solid connection between the game form 
and individual’s understanding of the game form. The needed theory might be related to 
perception, a concept that receives great emphasis by Tversky and Kahneman, who helpfully 
initiate specific axioms to capture departures of perceptions from reality.  Logic, learning or 
other phenomena could be important keys as well. Such tools are welcome additions to an effort 
                                                 
28 The related literature does hold suggestions. Our experimental results, and in particular the changed choice for 
many individuals who were exposed to a mistake, suggest that experience works through a process of evolving game 
form recognition. The key role of mistake exposure in second price auctions is clearly documented in Kagel and 
Levine (1993), who report that as a result of exposure to bid rejections bidders have a deeper understanding of the 
rules and adjust their bidding behavior accordingly.  Similarly, the data produced in field experiments conducted by 
List (2003) and Harrison and List (2008) differ from the data generated by untrained laboratory subjects because the 
subjects from the field are familiar with the game form and do not have the same game form misconceptions as 
untrained subjects or inexperienced participants in the field. Similarly, Engelmann and Hollard (2010) demonstrate 
that practice and experience have an impact on WTP and WTA differences.  
        Gigerenzer et al. (2008) gives us a hint suggesting that the concept of recognition heuristics might be useful in 
economics, which is consistent with a focus on the process of decision making as opposed to the development of an 
underlying preference.  A similar suggestion related to a process of recognition can be found in Myerson (1997), 
which he refers to as “salient perturbations.”  General axiomatic concepts of rationality and the importance of 
context are developed in Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995). 
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to identify failures of game form recognition in economic processes.  We do not know how to 
close the gaps among the various sciences involved in the controversy about the theoretical 
foundations of preferences, and we suspect it will require input from a variety of disciplines 
outside economics. Our experiment and analysis suggest that the key to understanding framing 
effects may be through changing perceptions and not through labile preferences. 
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